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Biocontainment may be required in a wide variety of situations
such as work with pathogens, field release applications of engi-
neered organisms, and protection of intellectual properties. Here,
we describe the control of growth of the brewer’s yeast, Saccharo-
myces cerevisiae, using both transcriptional and recombinational
“safeguard” control of essential gene function. Practical biocontain-
ment strategies dependent on the presence of small molecules re-
quire them to be active at very low concentrations, rendering them
inexpensive and difficult to detect. Histone genes were controlled
by an inducible promoter and controlled by 30 nM estradiol. The
stability of the engineered genes was separately regulated by the
expression of a site-specific recombinase. The combined frequency
of generating viable derivatives when both systems were active was
below detection (<10−10), consistent with their orthogonal nature
and the individual escape frequencies of <10−6. Evaluation of es-
caper mutants suggests strategies for reducing their emergence.
Transcript profiling and growth test suggest high fitness of safe-
guarded strains, an important characteristic for wide acceptance.
biotechnology | biosafety | Saccharomyces cerevisiae
The rapid development of biotechnology depends heavily onengineered microbes. In particular, the booming field of syn-
thetic biology (1) demonstrates the feasibility of de novo syn-
thesis of viral genomes (2–5), bacterial genomes (6, 7), and
eukaryotic chromosomes (8, 9). The technologies underpinning
synthetic biology are advanced DNA synthesis and assembly (10),
genome editing (11, 12), and computational assisted designs (13–
15), which are all becoming commoditized and thus increasingly
available to the public. The advance of synthetic biology prom-
ises to ultimately improve human living conditions through a
better understanding of fundamental sciences as well as a multi-
tude of practical applications. However, biosafety mechanisms
should be carefully considered to minimize or prevent dual use
(16). Professionals have chemically synthesized infectious virus
in the absence of natural templates (2) and reconstitute in-
fectious human retroviruses (3) and the 1918 “Spanish” in-
fluenza virus (5). At the same time, relative amateurs are trying
to engineer microbes in a do-it-yourself fashion (www.diybio.
org). Proactive measures are warranted to minimize both bio-
terror (e.g., the anthrax attack in the United States in 2000) and
“bioerror” (accidental environment releases or self-infection by
laboratory-adapted microbes as in the case of a laboratory in-
fection of an individual with hemochromatosis, where the victim
scientist’s high iron levels caused by hemochromatosis com-
plemented the natural iron requirement of attenuated Yersinia
pestis) (17). Intrinsic biocontainment can also be used to prevent
industrial espionage by protecting the intellectual property of
biotechnology companies. In light of the wide accessibility of
whole-genome sequencing, we envision in the future embedding
“decoy” circuits into the safeguard strains and the combinatorial
complexity will likely to defeat anyone who wants to decode the
safeguard strains.
Previous work on biocontainment has largely focused on
auxotrophic mutations or inducible lethality based on toxin–
antitoxin pairs in bacteria (18–21). There is also recent work to
reduce unintended plasmid propagation in bacteria (22). Exist-
ing biocontainment technologies usually depend on a single-
cellular mechanism. Such “uniplex” approaches lack redundancy,
and the leakiness of toxin genes often compromises fitness and
normal behavior of the engineered microbes, reducing the like-
lihood that they will be accepted by researchers or industrial
biotechnologists. Also, ongoing selection for the toxin gene is
required. Reduced fitness has three undesirable features: (i) it
reduces their usefulness as models for the behavior of the natural
organism, (ii) it may reduce their “performance” in industrial
applications, and (iii) it may increase the frequency of escape
mutants (revertants able to grow in the absence of the com-
pound). Finally, auxotrophic strains rely on supplementation of
corresponding nutrients at micromolar concentrations, rendering
them too costly for industrial scale-up. We have developed
multiplex safeguard switches regulated by a combination of small
molecules, some of which are active at submicromolar concen-
trations. In the future, one can envision supplying a blend of such
compounds as a kind of “special sauce” to keep a designer mi-
crobe alive. This too could be laced with decoy compounds to
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defy biohackers. Each safeguard switch technology targets a dif-
ferent cellular process and can be combined in a multiplex
fashion. With safeguard switches, we are able to regulate engi-
neered microbes with small molecules and contain them in
defined laboratory conditions to prevent escape to the environ-
ment. The safeguard switch concept also provides a potentially
effective way to protect intellectual property biotechnology, by
containing the engineered strains with defined combinations of
small molecules.
Here, we report two orthogonal safeguard switches, with
one targeting transcriptional control and another one based on
recombination-induced lethality; in both cases, one or more es-
sential genes are targeted, instead of autotrophic markers and/or
toxin genes to minimize physiological impacts on cell fitness.
Transcriptome profiling and growth tests confirm that fitness of
several safeguard strains is close to the wild type, and perfor-
mance on multiple media types suggests robustness to varying
conditions. The escape rates for individual safeguards are 10−8 to
10−6. Analysis of escape variants (revertants) sheds useful light to
guide the design of next-generation safeguard development.
Results
Goals and Overall Design Principles. To establish design principles
for generic genomic safeguards, we evaluated several designs
based on the premise that the desired combination of high fit-
ness, normal physiology, and tight control by a small molecule
could be obtained by putting essential genes under multiple
forms of chemical control. Here, we show that, by putting both
the presence/absence of the gene and its transcription under
chemical control, it is possible to produce yeast strains that live
or die according to the presence/absence of the ligand, and show
high-fitness and low-escape frequencies. Analysis of escapers
(revertants) provides insight into the mechanisms of escape that
can be used for a subsequent round of engineering to reduce
those escape frequencies. Here, we evaluated two essential
histone genes for performance as genome safeguards for
Saccharomyces cerevisiae in various contexts. As each of the two
histones studied were themselves encoded by two gene copies,
the studies were performed in strains in which both native copies
of histone H3 and both native copies of histone H4 genes had
been deleted from the genome (Fig. S1). We also screened other
essential genes for performance as safeguards.
Plasmid-Based Chemically Regulated Transcriptional Switches. As
a proof of principle, we first constructed a chemically regulated
transcriptional switch based on two essential synthetic histone
genes called HHTS and HHFS (encoding histone H3 and H4,
respectively; the “S” refers to the synthetic nature of the genes)
described in detail in ref. 23. In the safeguard strains described
here, the HHTS and HHFS genes are regulated by GAL1 and
GAL7 promoters, respectively, and each histone transcriptional
unit is flanked by a pair of loxP sites (see following sections for
detail). Thus, the transcription of the same genes can be regu-
lated by the presence of galactose or glucose in the growth me-
dium, or related methods, and the presence/absence of the genes
can be regulated by the expression of Cre recombinase activity.
This histone-based triplex safeguard was cloned into a pRS415
centromeric (episomal) vector (24) to construct plasmid pPC012
(Fig. 1).
To evaluate ability to function as a genome safeguard, we
generated yeast strain bearing the construct, PCy230 [his3Δ200
leu2Δ1 lys2Δ202 trp1Δ63 ura3-52 hht1-hhf1Δ::natMX4 hht2-
hhf2Δ::hygMX4 (pRS415-loxPWT-HHTS-loxPWT-HHFS-loxpWT);
Materials and Methods]. Strain PCy230 was subsequently plated
on both permissive (galactose) and restrictive (glucose) con-
ditions, and the escape (reversion) rate was calculated according
to Luria and Delbruck fluctuation analysis using the method of
the median (25) (Table S1). Although the escape rate was quite
favorable at 10−7, we observed a significant fitness defect by
comparing the colony size of PCy230 with that of a control strain
(Fig. S2). Subsequent transcriptome profiling indicated that
a large number of genes were dysregulated, possibly as a result of
the combined effects of variations in plasmid copy number and
the accumulation of a fraction of cells that had lost plasmid
under permissive conditions (Fig. S3).
Chromosomal Integration of Histone Switches Restores Fitness. We
hypothesized that the fitness decrease of PCy230 may reflect
variations in histone abundance in individual cells as the copy
number of centromeric plasmids can fluctuate between one and
three copies. Alternatively, it was possible that the expression of
the two histone genes would give rise to aberrant histone ratios
that differed from the native situation, or deviations in expres-
sion dynamics between galactose inducible and native histone
promoters. Integration of the histone-based safeguard into the
genome would ensure stable single copy. Thus, we integrated
the histone safeguard (tagged with URA3) into the HO locus
of PCy230, and after spontaneous mitotic loss of the original
pPC012 plasmid (tagged with LEU2) on YP-galactose medium,
we constructed integrated safeguard strains PCy596–599. These
integrated safeguard strains have similar low escape rates as
PCy230 on glucose (Table S1), yet the fitness and gene expression
profiles were significantly improved as determined by measuring
colony sizes (Fig. S4A), doubling time (Fig. S4B), and transcriptome
profiling (Fig. S4C).
Regulating Transcriptional Switches with 30 nM Estradiol. For many
applications, a low ligand concentration, and a nonnative ligand
unlikely to alter cell physiology are desirable. To demonstrate
ability to regulate the cell viability using nonnative small mole-
cules at nanomolar concentration, we transformed a second
plasmid pHCA/GAL4(1-93).ER.VP16 (henceforth called GEV)
that produces a GAL4 DBNA binding domain–estrogen receptor–
VP16 tribrid protein (GAL4DB.ER.VP16; GEV) (26), into safe-
guard strain PCy599 to construct strain NAy236. This safeguard
Fig. 1. The structure of triplex histone switch. Duplex integrated safeguard
based on a pair of histone genes. Histone H3 gene HHTS is regulated by
a galactose promoter pGAL1, and the histone H4 gene HHFS is controlled
by another galactose promoter pGAL7. Each histone switch is flanked by
a pair of loxP sites. The duplex histone safeguard switches can either be on
a CEN/ARS plasmid (A) or integrated into a genomic locus (B). Either the
native Gal4 protein or an engineered tribrid protein called GEV turns on the
transcription of the histone genes in the presence of their ligands, such that
the engineered yeast survives. The third level of redundancy is use of an
orthogonal control mechanism, site-specific recombination. Any pair of loxP
sites (yellow diamonds) on the construct will recombine and delete one or
both histone genes upon Cre, activation, leading to inviability. Both proteins
can be independently controlled by small molecule(s). Hooked arrows, pro-
moters; filled arrows, histone genes; blue lozenges, standardized vector
components; HOL, HOR, sequences to Left and Right of HO gene, where the
safeguard was integrated.
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strain can be regulated not only by galactose, used at millimolar
concentrations, but also by estradiol, a small molecule nonnative
to yeast able to maintain viability at submicromolar (30 nM)
concentrations. The GEV localizes into nucleus and binds to
Gal4p consensus sequences to activate transcription of the tar-
geted gene, upon induction by β-estradiol. The GEV protein is
retained in the cytoplasm by Hsp90 in the absence of estradiol,
resulting in fairly tight control of gene expression. We were able
to regulate the histone safeguard strains (PCy230 and PCy599)
with 30 nM estradiol on normal glucose-containing yeast growth
medium, with an escape reversion frequency of 10−7 to 10−9
(Fig. 2 and Table S1).
Escape Mutant Analysis: GEV-Regulated GAL-Histone Transcriptional
Safeguards. We isolated five independent escape mutants of the
GEV-regulated histone safeguard strains, which grow on glucose
media in absence of the estradiol. The GEV plasmids from those
five escapers were recovered from yeast into Escherichia coli,
transformed into the parental strain PCy599, and tested for their
ability to recapitulate the “growth in absence of estradiol” phe-
notype (Fig. S5A), and sequenced with the same primers (Table
S2). Interestingly, many of the escape mutants seemingly grow
less well than the parental strain in the presence of estradiol,
suggesting there will be selective pressure against their accu-
mulation (Fig. S5A). All five plasmids that recapitulated the
phenotype had mutations, mostly large internal deletions in the
human estrogen receptor (hER) domain of the gene that delete
the estradiol-responsive domain but remain in-frame with the
downstream VP16 (Fig. 3A and Table S3). Similarly, we tested
that reintroducing a fresh GEV plasmid restored estradiol de-
pendence (Fig. S5B).
Chemically Regulated Site-Specific Recombination Switches. In our
previous work on synthetic yeast chromosomes (8, 9), we have
adapted a chemically regulated Cre (27) and shown that it very
effectively kills yeast with a semisynthetic genome containing
numerous loxP sites flanking a number of essential genes. The
specialized Cre protein from ref. 27 is tightly regulated both
transcriptionally and posttranslationally. A daughter-cell–spe-
cific promoter, pSCW11, ensures expression only in the daughter
cell state. Furthermore, the Cre is fused to the estrogen binding
domain (EBD), which is unfolded in the absence of estradiol,
causing it to be retained in the cytoplasm by binding to the
Hsp90 chaperone. In the following proof-of-principle experi-
ments, we induced Cre with estradiol, leading to excision of the
histone gene(s) and loss of viability. Ultimately, it will be desir-
able to “reverse” this logic, so that the small molecule maintains
the viability of the cell.
We transformed the pSCW11-Cre-EBD plasmid into safe-
guard strain PCy230 to construct PCy251, and induced killing on
Gal plates (galactose is required to maintain histone gene ex-
pression) with 1 μM estradiol, intended to delete the histone
genes, despite their expression. However, in this context, the
killing effect was not as complete as expected. We hypothesized
that this was due to SCW11 promoter strength/expression
properties, and thus we constructed a set of Cre-EBD plasmids
by replacing the SCW11 promoter with various constitutive yeast
promoters (Materials and Methods). After transforming the set of
constructed Cre-EBD plasmids into PCy230 and screening on
Gal-estradiol plates, pTDH3-Cre-EBD turned out to be the best
candidate for our application, as it effectively killed the safe-
guard strain upon induction but remained inactive in the absence
of estradiol. Upon estradiol induction, the Cre protein localizes
into the nucleus and excises the histone transcription unit(s)
residing between the three loxP sites. The reversion rate of this
site-specific recombination-based safeguard was systematically
measured and is less than 10−6.
Escape Mutant Analysis: CRE-EBD Sensitivity of GAL-Histone
Recombinational Safeguards. We evaluated the site-specific re-
combination regulation of the original GAL-histone safeguard
in the presence of a CRE-EBD plasmid by studying escape
mutants. We isolated 21 independent escape mutants of the
safeguard strains that grew in the restrictive condition of Cre
expression, which in this case is galactose containing 1 μM es-
tradiol. The Cre-EBD plasmids were recovered and retrans-
formed into the parent strain PCy599, and the resulting strains
were found to be insensitive to estradiol induction, confirming
that the responsible mutation resided on the plasmid. The Cre-
EBD mutant plasmids were sequenced to identify the mutations
leading to the phenotype (Fig. 3B and Table S3), and we ob-
served a wide variety of mutations predicted to lead to a loss of
function. Of the 21 plasmids, 2 had insertions (of 3 and 8 bp), 7
had missense or nonsense mutations in the Cre coding region, 5
had various deletions in the Cre and/or EBD regions, and finally
7 of them complete lost the Cre-EBD insert, instead containing
either a single loxP site or loxP sites flanking the histone ex-
pression cassette (unlike the parental plasmid, which had none).
Fig. 2. Regulating histone-based safeguard switches with 30 nM estradiol.
The GEV-regulated histone safeguard strains grow well on permissive
medium and die under restrictive conditions. The histone strain PCy599
with GEV plasmid grows well on both galactose medium and estradiol-
supplemented glucose medium, and cannot survive on glucose medium
without estradiol.
Fig. 3. Escape mutant analysis. Both GEV and Cre-EBD plasmids of escape
mutants were isolated and analyzed. (A) Most of the plasmids bore in-frame
deletions in the hER region that retained the C-terminal VP16 activator se-
quence. One plasmid had a 4-bp insertion, and the protein is predicted to
have an out-of-frame C-terminal tail of 26 aa, of which 5 are acidic residues,
a sequence that might serve as a transcriptional activator. See also Table S3.
(B) The mutations found in the Cre-EBD constructs are mostly missense
mutations in the Cre coding region or deletions (deletions that are also out
of frame are indicated by a stippled line for the out-of-frame segment) in
the Cre and/or EBD domains. See also Table S3.
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The latter category of mutant can be explained by assuming
there were two copies of the histone plasmid. We propose that
homologous recombination between one copy of the safeguard
plasmid (based on pRS415-LEU2) and the pTdh-Cre-EBD
plasmid (based on the largely identical pRS413-HIS3) occurred,
producing a Cre-EBD-LEU2 plasmid and a histone HIS3 plas-
mid. Upon Cre-EBD induction, an “empty” HIS3 plasmid con-
taining just the loxP site would be produced at high frequency.
Subsequent mitotic loss of the Cre-EBD plasmid, a frequent
event, would produce the observed configurations.
Combined Escape of Transcriptional and Recombinational Safeguard
Switches Not Observed. We performed a combined escape ex-
periment by plating yeast strain PCy599 carrying TDH3-Cre-
EBD by growing cells permissively, and then plating nearly 1010
cells on restrictive medium (glucose plus estradiol). Even after
replica plating (i.e., two rounds of growth on restrictive medium),
no escaper colonies were observed. We estimate that the cells went
through at least one doubling after hitting the selective plates, pos-
sibly more. Thus, we conclude that the reversion frequency was
<10−10, consistent with the predicted frequency of about 10−12.
Construction of Additional Safeguard Switches. To screen for ad-
ditional essential genes suitable as candidate safeguards, we used
a variant of the Golden Gate DNA assembly method (28) to
efficiently design and construct a systematic set of safeguard
switches (Fig. 4). A library of parts (promoters, genes and 3′-
UTRs), along with a set of acceptor vectors, was constructed and
sequence verified. Using a Golden Gate reaction, we assembled
17 essential genes under three different galactose promoters
(pGAL1, pGAL7, and pGAL10), respectively.
These were tested individually in the corresponding hetero-
zygous diploid yeast deletion mutant. Diploids transformed with
the appropriate test plasmid were sporulated, and tetrads were
dissected on permissive agar plates, and resulting haploid spore
clones were replica plated onto restrictive plates to identify po-
tential safeguard strains. We identified three essential genes,
namely SUI1, HSP10, and RPC11, as preferred gene candidates
by this method. The selection criteria were as follows: the safe-
guard strain (i) should grow well on the permissive medium and
(ii) should have a low escape rate under restrictive conditions.
Transcriptome profiling was carried out on the constructed
safeguard strains to identify potential fitness defects (Fig. 5). The
GEV plasmid and CreEBD plasmid were separately transformed
into such an RPC11 safeguard strain, to construct estradiol-
regulated transcriptional switch safeguard strain and site-specific
recombination-regulated safeguard strains, respectively.
Reducing Leakiness of Safeguard Switches. We discovered that the
non–histone-based GEV-regulated safeguard strains grew under
restrictive conditions and hypothesized that this resulted from
leakiness of the galactose promoters (pGAL1/pGAL7/pGAL10)
in this context, where lower amounts of the protein products
might be required for viability than for histone genes. In previous
work (31), various numbers (2–10) of Gal4 binding sites were
fused to the SPO13 promoter, which contains a repressive up-
stream regulatory sequence (URS) sequence, to generate a set of
tightly regulated galactose-dependent promoters called SPAL
promoters (SPO/GAL). We retrieved this set of promoters from
strains containing such promoters (Materials and Methods) and
use them to construct a second generation of safeguard strains
based on RPC11. The resulting safeguard strains had the ap-
propriate growth phenotypes compared with those with native
galactose promoters (Fig. S6).
Discussion
Engineering containment is anticipated to be more critical than
ever as the world transitions from a petroleum economy to a
bioeconomy for producing a wide variety of chemicals and fuels,
and as the ease of constructing more and more complex bi-
ological systems needed to accomplish this grows. Containment
will be critical for any field application of engineered organisms
but is also extremely desirable for any work done on pathogenic
organisms, from the perspectives of investigator safety and pre-
vention of accidental or intentional release of harmful organisms
from the laboratory environment. Finally, biotechnology com-
panies make large financial investments in building specific
strains of bacteria and yeast for large-scale fermentation. Pre-
venting the theft of such organisms is a challenging problem, but
genomic safeguards such as those described here have the po-
tential to minimize the risk of such intellectual property.
In order for safeguards to be practically useful, they require
several engineered features: redundancy, robustness, low escape
frequencies, and low cost. The likelihood of their widespread
adoption by experimentalists and industrial biotechnologists
alike also requires strong evidence that the safeguard itself does
not affect cellular metabolism or phenotype.
Redundancy. We show here two different forms of redundancy.
The first is to use two essential genes rather than just one. The
second is to use two modes of dependency, one being tran-
scriptional and the other, the presence/absence of the gene, i.e.,
recombinational. In the latter case, two distinct small molecules,
galactose and estradiol, were used to control the switch.
Robustness. Cells in the environment might face a wide variety of
conditions. It would be useful to know that the safeguard has
little or no effect on growth in the presence of the ligand but also
that growth in the absence of the ligand was similarly absent
under multiple conditions. With our histone safeguard, we
showed that performance was excellent in both minimal and rich
medium conditions, two environments routinely used in the
laboratory. We also observed that our histone safeguard with the
GEV system can function over a wide range starting at 5 nM
estradiol concentration, and the system is positive up to at least
100 nM. This is advantageous in a complex biological environ-
ment such as a bioreactor or a fermenter, where levels of exog-
enous molecules may not be as homogenously distributed as in
a well-controlled laboratory environment. It would be interesting
to expand these studies to wider ranges of conditions.
Fig. 4. Construction of multiplex integrated safeguard strains. A Golden
Gate assembly-based method was developed to construct various combina-
tions of safeguards. A selected essential gene [your favorite essential gene
(YFEG)] can be quickly assembled with a given promoter and a 3′-UTR into
an acceptor vector [A; where red colonies are due to vector reassembly (they
express RFP) and white colonies are the right assemblies] and integrate into
the corresponding yeast mutant (B) to test the behavior of the safeguard
strain under both permissive and restrictive conditions (C).
1806 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1424704112 Cai et al.
Escape Frequencies. Because each safeguard described here pro-
duces escapers at a frequency of about one in a million or in
some cases significantly less, it is anticipated by duplexing them
very favorable escape rates of 10−12 or lower might be obtained.
In our experiment to evaluate the combined transcriptional and
recombinational switches, we failed to identify escapers, consis-
tent with this prediction. Interestingly, many of the observed
revertants grow less well than the parental in the presence of the
ligand, suggesting their persistence in population will be mini-
mized. Similarly, triplex or higher-plex safeguards should pro-
duce increasingly stringent levels of control.
Cost. The key to low cost is to identify ligands that are both
relatively inexpensive per gram and that operate at low con-
centrations, preferably micromolar or even nanomolar. Our
work demonstrates that the estradiol-based GEV-based safe-
guard operates at a concentration of 30 nM with escape rate
characteristics. Because estradiol is a commodity that can be
purchased cheaply, the cost of treating a 1,000-L fermentor is
estimated at US$0.13.
Minimal Phenotype Effects. We evaluated the impact of the safe-
guards on fitness by examining colony size. We hypothesize that
the use of essential genes, rather than toxins, to control cell
growth is inherently more favorable to overall growth properties
and lack of perturbation of cellular systems. Indeed, the histone
switch, once integrated in single copy, was surprisingly fit. As a
first evaluation of the impact of the safeguards we built, we ex-
amined the transcriptome effects of both the essential genes used
in safeguards and ligands commonly used to keep them in the
“on” state. Although the systems in use were not perfect in that
effects were observed on gene expression, the extent of these
perturbations varied significantly across different essential genes
and small molecules. This helps with prioritization of the most
promising designs.
Escaper (revertant) analyses suggest means to reduce escape
frequencies. For the Cre-EBD and GEV constructs, escapers
affecting the function of these proteins were isolated. For the
Cre-EBD, the mutations isolated were loss-of-function muta-
tions. This frequency could be greatly lowered by simultaneously
expressing a second recoded copy of the same gene, because
mutations of this type should be recessive. The GEV mutants
could similarly be reduced in frequency by incorporating two
ligand-binding domains into the same protein.
One key limitation to safeguard design and construction is the
paucity of well-regulated transcriptional regulatory systems
controlled by low-cost nontoxic small molecules that can work
across prokaryotic and eukaryotic systems generically. Besides
estradiol, there are several low-cost natural and synthetic hor-
mone and hormone binding domains that have been proven to
regulate protein activity in various systems including budding
yeast, such as androgen (29), glucocorticoid (30), and pro-
gesterone/RU486 (31). Once carefully characterized, these small
molecular/binding domain pairs can potentially be used to build
orthogonal safeguard switches in the future. Also, prokaryotic
strains have been engineered in parallel, using many of the same
design philosophies (32, 33). We anticipate that many improve-
ments can and will be made to safeguards in the coming years to
anticipate the explosion of recombinant organisms under study in
basic and industrial research laboratories, resulting in an increased
focus on safety mechanisms integral to the systems under study.
Materials and Methods
Strains, Plasmids, and Oligonucleotides. Yeast strains and the plasmids con-
tained are listed in Table S5. Oligonucleotides used are listed in Table S2.
Plasmid Shuffling. Plasmid pPC012 was transformed into a yeast strain, JDY6,
from which all four genomic copies of histones H3 and H4 genes had been
previously deleted (23) with viability maintained by plasmid pDM9, a plasmid
carrying the URA3marker and wild-type histone H3 and H4 genes HHT1 and
HHF1. After introducing pPC012, a centromeric (CEN) LEU2 plasmid, into the
strain by LioAc/SS/PEG transformation (34), plasmid shuffling on 5-fluoro-
orotic acid [5-Foa (35)], 2% (wt/vol) galactose medium was successful, indi-
cating that the GAL promoters could successfully express the two histone
genes. More importantly, such 5-FoaR strains were unable to grow on glu-
cose, consistent with effective shutoff of histone gene expression.
Golden Gate DNA Assembly. The Golden Gate assembly protocol is described
in ref. 28. Specifically, a 15-μL Golden Gate reaction containing 1.5 μL of 10×
T4 DNA ligase reaction buffer (New England Biolabs), 0.15 μL of 100× BSA
(New England Biolabs), 1 μL of 600 units/μL T4 DNA ligase (Enzymatics), 10 μL
of H2O, 1 μL of acceptor vector DNA (∼100 ng/μL), and 0.5 μL of insert DNA
(∼100 ng/μL). The following temperature cycles were used: 1 h at 37 °C,
5 min at 50 °C, 5 min at 80 °C followed by incubation at 4 °C. One microliter
of the finished Golden Gate reaction was transformed into 100 μL of
Top10/DH5α chemical-competent cells.
Plasmid Recovery from Yeast. Plasmid recovery from yeast was carried out
using a Zymoprep yeast plasmid miniprep kit (Zymo Research) following the
manufacturer’s instructions.
Cloning and Sequencing of SPALX Promoters. Twelve yeast MAV strains (36)
containing various numbers of Gal4 binding sites were used as template to
clone out SPAL promoters with varying numbers of Gal4 binding sites. Ge-
nomic DNAs of these yeast strains were extracted using phenol/chloroform
isolation method. Two rounds of PCR were used to amplify the SPALX pro-
moters from genomic DNA: first, F primer PC_oligo379 and Ura3 R primer
PC_oligo380 were used; then the PCR product was diluted 1,000-fold. Pri-
mers PC_oligo401 and PC_oligo324 were used to amplify the SPAL promoter
fragments with appropriate Golden Gate overhangs. The PCR products were
cloned using a Zero Blunt Topo kit (Life Technologies). The resulting plas-
mids were sequenced to identify the exact number of Gal4 binding sites.
These promoters were used in subsequent assembly of safeguard switches to
identify tighter constructs.
β-Estradiol Induction of Cre Expression. Safeguard strains were grown up on
appropriate selective growth medium, then either plated or spotted on
appropriate selective solid medium containing 1 μM β-estradiol, and in-
cubated at 30 °C for 2–3 d.
β-Estradiol Induction of GEV System. Safeguard strains were grown up in
appropriate glucose selective growth medium containing 30 nM β-estradiol,
then either plated or spotted on appropriate glucose selective solid medium
containing 30 nM β-estradiol (or restrictive plates lacking estradiol), and
incubated at 30 °C for 2–3 d.
Fig. 5. Transcriptome profiling of safeguard strains. Transcriptome profiling
of various safeguard strains. The graph is organized by gene/promoter pairs.
The blue dots in the volcano plots represent statistically significant dysregu-
lated genes (see Table S4 for lists of genes affected). The transcriptome pro-
filing shows limited transcriptome changes to the safeguard strains compared
with the wild type, with GAL10-RPC11 showing the best performance.
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Reversion Rate Measurement and Colony Picking for Sequencing. Escape rates
were calculated using the method of the median (25). For measurement rates
in the 10−5 to 10−9 range, 5–12 independent cultures (each grown from
a single parent colony) were inoculated into 20 mL of SC–His supplemented
with 2% galactose in liquid cultures. In total, 108 and 107 cells were plated
on restrictive medium. Viable titer was determined by plating 100 μL of a
five to six serial 10-fold dilution on permissive medium. The reversion fre-
quency was obtained by dividing colony-forming units on restrictive plates
by colony-forming units on permissive plates. The median reversion fre-
quency was then used to calculate the rate using the method of the median.
For each safeguard strain to be measured, five “escaper” revertant col-
onies were picked from independently grown cultures and grown up in
10 mL of permissive liquid culture (with plasmid selection if applicable), for
48 h at 30 °C. Tenfold serial dilutions were plated on restrictive and per-
missive agar plates, and incubated at 30 °C for 2–3 d until single colonies
appeared. One colony was chosen per culture to assure independence.
RNASeq. A single colony was picked and grown up in 10 mL of permissive
liquid medium, and incubated at 30 °C until the A600 was between 0.8 and
1.2, and RNA was isolated as described using a Qiagen RNAEasy kit using the
manufacturer’s protocol. We performed RNASeq of strains integrating the
histone, RPC11, SUI1, and HSP10 safeguards. mRNA was sequenced using an
Illumina HiSeq and standard TruSeq preparation kits. For each strain, we
obtained ∼12 million 50-bp single-end reads. Reads were mapped using
TOPHAT (37) to the reference S. cerevisiae genome (S288c). Approximately
95% of the reads were mapped. For each gene, read counts were computed
using HTSEQ (38) and analyzed for differential expression using DESEQ (39),
with standard parameters and following the no-replicates scenario. For each
gene, we obtained a raw P value and an adjusted P value using the standard
Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (40). We used the 1% false-discovery rate
(adjusted P value ≤ 0.01) to identify genes that are significantly differentially
expressed. Differentially expressed genes are reported in Table S4.
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